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Lee A. Windsor 
Since the end of the Second World War the performance of the Canadian Army and its 
senior leadership in Europe has come under 
increasing criticism. John A. English has 
addressed these issues in The Canadian Army 
and the Normandy Campaign: A Study in the 
Failure of High Command. Bill McAndrew has 
also drawn attention to the failure of Canadian 
units in the Italian theatre in an article for Military 
Affairs entitled "Fire or Movement? Canadian 
Tactical Doctrine, Sicily, 1943." These historians 
have focused on operations that have had less 
than completely satisfactory results in order to 
demonstrate the problems with the Canadian way 
of war. While this is an important exercise, it is 
equally important to look at cases in which the 
Canadian Army performed well. The thrust of 1st 
Canadian Division to take the town of Potenza is 
j u s t one of many examples of super ior 
performance in the Italian Campaign. 
English and McAndrew argue that Canadian 
opera t ions over -emphas ized firepower, 
particularly artillery. "The most serious result 
seems to have been a loss of flexibility - of mind 
as well as movement - which limited 
oppor tun i t i e s for exploring unexpec ted 
openings."1 Strict adherence to elaborate 
fireplans restricted the freedom of manoeuvre 
available to battalion commanders. English also 
stresses poor leadership and shoddy staff work 
as leading causes of Canadian ineffectiveness as 
the subtitle of his book, A Study of Failure in 
High Command, suggests.2 
The action at Potenza does not fit this model. 
First Canadian Division was blessed with a staff 
seasoned in the hills of Sicily and one of the most 
able commanders Canada has ever produced, 
Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds. The plan 
to take Potenza was not dictated by fire. Indeed, 
its key was speed and surprise, making maximum 
use of the initiative of junior commanders who 
rose to the occasion. 
In the middle of September 1943, the Anglo-American Allies were caught in a somewhat 
embarrassing situation. On all fronts the Axis 
forces were on the defensive. In the Pacific, the 
Japanese were being driven out of their only 
recently won empire by the "island hopping" 
forces of the United States. In the Soviet Union, 
the Germans had suffered a disastrous defeat at 
Stalingrad; their last hope of victory was now 
gone. The combined armies of Germany and Italy 
had been surrounded and captured in Tunis. 
Sicily had fallen as the stepping stone to 
continental Europe, to be followed closely by the 
landing of Allied troops on mainland Italy, 
bringing the final collapse of the Italian war 
machine. It was in southern Italy that the Allied 
run of good fortune seemed as though it might 
abruptly stop. Four days after the landing at 
Salerno on 9 September 1943, in the "ankle" of 
the Italian peninsula, the Anglo-American Fifth 
Army was considering withdrawal in the face of 
heavy German counterattacks. "The Germans 
outmatched the Allied build-up and soon pinned 
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Lieutenent-Colonel M.P. "Pat" Bogert, CO of the West 
Nova Scotia Regiment, (holding map board) 
discussing the action at Potenza with Mqjor-General 
Guy Simonds, GOC 1st Canadian Infantry Division. 
(NAC PA 193388) 
"flying columns" in the Italian foot since the 
landing at Reggio. The fully motorized Potenza 
force would possess the elements of speed and 
substantial firepower, thus making a rapid 
approach possible, yet with enough strength to 
take on considerable opposition. This was not 
the type of operation Montgomery was fond of, 
compared to his set piece battles in North Africa 
and Sicily; indeed he referred to Simonds' plan 
as an "administrative risk," but given the 
logistical situation and the urgent need to link 
all Allied forces in a single front across southern 
Italy, it appeared to be the only possible solution.9 
Simonds envisioned a flying column in the 
advance to Potenza as the vanguard for what was, 
in effect, a divisional operation. Boforce would 
be drawn from Howard Penhale's 3rd Brigade, 
the remainder of which would follow as closely 
as possible. The other two brigades in the division 
would not be far behind either. "Boforce," was 
the largest such team yet assembled by the 
Canadian Army. In addition to the West Nova 
Scotia Regiment's infantrymen, the Calgary 
Regiment (14th CTR) would furnish "A" Squadron 
as the armoured component. The Royal Canadian 
Artillery would also contribute substantially to 
5th Army down on the floor of the great 
amphitheatre-like plain of the Sele River."3 
Highly effective air strikes and particularly naval 
gunfire helped to avoid disaster, but the most 
direct means of relieving the pressure on the 
beachhead would be to speed up the advance of 
Eighth Army.4 However, its progress up the 
Calabrian peninsula was proceeding more slowly 
than had been hoped, due to the extensive 
demolitions carried out by German engineers 
along the already poor road network. Allied 
engineers were the key to speeding up this drive, 
but their task was exceedingly difficult due to the 
shortage of bridging equipment, fuel and other 
vital stores.5 The limited sealift available in the 
Mediterranean had to be concentrated to build-
up the beleaguered Fifth Army. 
This period of crisis gave birth to "Boforce," 
an all-arms combat team which was named for 
its leader, Lieutenant-Colonel M.P. "Pat" Bogert 
of the West Nova Scotia Regiment. Their task 
was to race over 125 miles of winding road to 
Potenza, in the rear of the main German positions 
at Salerno, in an effort to assist the embattled 
Fifth Army. 
While the mission was still in the planning stage 
the Salerno situation improved. By 16 September, 
the German Tenth Army had begun a phased 
withdrawal. Thus "Boforce's" task would change; it 
would pursue the retreating Germans to prevent 
them from catching their breath long enough to 
turn and make another stand. While the Salerno 
beachhead was no longer in serious jeopardy and 
the Germans were withdrawing, "a quick stride 
forward by Montgomery's forces would undoubtedly 
hasten the process."6 
It was the German intention that by the night 
of 21-22 September the Corps [76th Panzer] 
should have reached a line extending from 
Salerno through Potenza to Altamura.7 
The German left would then continue to fall back 
to a second line just in front of the Foggia Plain 
which was to be held at least until 30 September. 
The question was, as G. W.L. Nicholson points out 
in the Canadian Army official history, whether or 
not that plan could be accelerated or disrupted.8 
"Boforce" had been the idea of Major-General 
Guy Simonds, commanding 1st Canadian 
Division, based on his experience using similar 
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"Boforce" with "C" Battery of the 1st Battalion, 
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, and two troops 
from the 1st Anti-tank Regiment. The divisional 
support battalion, the Saskatoon Light Infantry, 
provided a platoon of Vickers medium machine-
guns. Three Platoon of the 1st Field Company 
made up the engineer detachment. "A" Company 
of the 9th Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian 
Army Medical Corps, completed the force."10 Air 
power was not considered in the operational 
planning as air resources on both sides were 
concentrated at Salerno. As a precaution 
however, "C" Troop, 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft 
Battery, was included in the column. 
Late in the morning of 17 September, Major -
General Simonds met with Bogert to give a final 
briefing, following which, at 1230 hours, "Boforce" 
set out up the coast road. Just what Bogert and 
his troops would do if they contacted the enemy 
was not known, as it was difficult to plan in advance 
for any action when intelligence on enemy activity 
was weak and the "only maps available were small 
scale [1:250 000] things made from old Italian 
surveys, with little detail of the heights and 
contours."11 Once on the move, situations would 
have to be dealt with as they arose. 
That first day of the advance was quite 
uneventful; the first leg of the route had already 
been reconnoitred by a smaller column consisting 
of the Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards as well 
as one company of the Carleton and York 
Regiment. The soldiers of "Boforce" instead had 
the opportunity to enjoy the drive along the scenic 
coastal highway, although many were no doubt 
more concerned about when the German Army 
would stand and fight. 
On the morning of 18 September, "Boforce" 
passed through the forward Canadian positions 
near San Arcangelo and continued on towards 
Corleto until it came to an abrupt stop, 2600 meters 
south of the town.12 It was time for the engineers to 
go to work as the bridge over a small river bed had 
been blown, the first in a series of such delays. The 
sappers began working on a diversion, but the 
vehicles would be unable to go on past Corleto 
anyway as its streets were choked with the rubble 
created by Allied bombing. "D" Company was 
immediately set to the task of clearing a path 
through the rubble. Meanwhile, an engineer 
reconnaissance detachment continued forward with 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert, part of his command 
group, and "B" Company.13 
Top: A Calgary Sherman recovers a bogged down 
armoured car near one of the demolished bridges 
on the road to Potenza. (NAC PA 144114) 
Above: "D" Company, West Nova Scotia Regiment 
works to make Corleto's streets passable for tanks 
while "B" Company advances on foot. 
(NAC PA 193389) 
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss2/6
During the remainder of 18 September and 
early the next day several more demolitions were 
encountered, but the enemy remained elusive. Later, 
on the morning of 19 September, the infantrymen of 
"A" Company rounded the bend in the road near the 
Camastra River bridge, south of Anzi, just in time to 
watch it blast apart. The German sappers who had 
just carried out the demolition, noticed their audience 
and opened fire. The West Novas scattered for cover 
and immediately returned small arms fire with their 
.303 Enfield rifles and Bren guns. Not everyone made 
it safely to cover; a vital member of the "Boforce" 
team. Captain Buchanan, the artillery forward 
observation officer (FOO), was slightly wounded in 
the exchange of fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert 
planned a hasty attack, utilizing the battalion's three-
inch mortar platoon, under Lieutenant R. W. Bullock, 
to assist in laying down a base of fire, while "A" 
Company provided the assault element. The brief 
engagement was reminiscent of the German delaying 
tactics encountered by Canadian units in the early 
stages of the Sicilian Campaign, for as soon as 
Bullock's mortarmen started lobbing shells and "A" 
Company deployed for the attack, the Germans broke 
contact and withdrew. No other known casualties 
were taken by either side with the exception of a 
German lorry left burning near the destroyed bridge.14 
The newly formed obstacle was easily bypassed 
and by this time the heavy vehicles had caught up, 
so once again, the armour took up the lead, with the 
adrenaline-charged soldiers of "A" Company riding 
on top. The last town that would be passed through 
before reaching Potenza was Anzi, with 17 miles 
separating them. The leading tanks found another 
destroyed bridge just outside of Anzi at about midday 
on 19 September, but a diversion was easily 
constructed and once again the troops pushed on. 
In the town itself, contact was made with more 
German sappers who had been sowing Teller mines 
in the road, only this time it was the gunner of the 
lead Sherman who was the quickest on the draw.15 
Several 75-millimetre shells were hurled at three 
German lorries which promptly collected their 
passengers and scuttled off. "Thus hustled, the 
enemy had no time for elaborate demolitions or 
properly to conceal the mines, "16 which, left unburied, 
were easily dealt with by the Canadian engineers, 
and "Boforce" continued on. Only a short time after 
sundown, at 1930 hours, 19 September, the force 
had reached the high ground overlooking the 
Basento River valley, and the town of Potenza. 
A Jeep Ambulance of 9 Field Ambulance passes the 
wreck of a German lorry knocked out by West Nova 
mortar fire south of Anzi after a German engineer 
detail was caught in the act of blowing a bridge. 
(NAC PA 193390) 
The town itself represented a formidable 
obstacle, being si tuated in a dominating 
position part way up the northern slope of the 
valley, commanding excellent fields of fire and 
observation. The town was full of concrete 
apartment blocks and rubble choked streets 
created by the Allied bombing which would 
further favour the defender by preventing, or 
at least hindering the employment of armour 
in support of an infantry assault.17 
It had already been dark for some time when 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert arrived on the heights 
overlooking Potenza, thus it was impossible to 
conduct a thorough reconnaissance or take 
advantage of his excellent observation point. 
Instead, the tactical plan had to be formulated 
almost entirely from maps, never a favourable 
option, made worse by the poor quality of Italian 
charts. Another negative factor in the plan of 
attack was the lack of hard intelligence on enemy 
strength in the area.18 
Consequent ly, Bogert had very little 
concrete information on which to base his plan, 
making the initial attack a reconnaissance in 
itself. Bogert originally planned to launch his 
attack at dawn so that the West Novas could 
be properly supported by artillery, but this was 
not to be. In order to offset the German 
55 
5
Windsor: “Boforce”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1995
"Adjunct" of "A" Squadron, The Calgary Regiment, overlooking Potenza. In the centre of the photo can be 
seen the railyard where the lead companies came under heavy fire. The bridges over the dry bed of the 
Basento can also be seen. 20 September 1943. (NAC PA 144103) 
blown and the surrounding area had been 
mined, including the dry river bed.21 This new 
information was factored into the plan which 
would now see "D" Company move into a 
position from where it could cover a sapper 
detail that would clear a path through the 
mines. Following the completion of the breach, 
"D" and "C" Companies would advance towards 
the town. "A" Company would move up to cover 
the engineers, who would continue working to 
widen the minefield breach and to construct a 
vehicle diversion around the blown bridge so 
that the armour could push through to support 
the leading platoons. "B" Company would serve 
as the tactical reserve.22 
advantages of observation, which could 
potentially serve to annihilate a daylight 
assault, General Simonds ordered "Boforce" to 
make a grab for the town that very night.19 
This attack was to begin an hour after the 
moon rose at 2300 hours. The rifle companies 
would make their approach into the valley in 
motor transport and dismount near the first of 
a series of three bridges which carried the main 
road across the Basento and two other 
connecting creeks.20 At this time of year the 
watercourses were all dry and easily negotiated 
by infantry, but reconnaissance patrols had 
discovered that the first of the bridges had been 
56 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss2/6
that could be done to support the lead companies 
at this point was to provide suppressive fire in an 
attempt to neutralize some of the German positions, 
but this had to be done with extreme caution as it 
was unclear exactly how far the forward platoons 
had penetrated.27 The fire of the artillery, 3-inch 
mortars, and medium machine guns was used 
largely in a harassment role; firing on targets of 
opportunity or being adjusted by radio and runner.28 
The increasing daylight also brought German 
small arms fire down around the engineers working 
at the first bridge. Their task was further 
compounded by the thoroughness of their German 
counterparts, who had booby-trapped many of the 
mines with anti-lifting devices.29 Two 6-pounder 
anti-tank guns, as well as a troop of the heavier 17-
pounder guns of the 57th Anti-Tank Battery, were 
deployed near the first bridge and immediately 
began firing on the weapons signatures of the 
German machine guns that were harassing the 
sappers.30 Yet it would still take some time to clear 
a safe approach on this axis of advance for infantry 
or armour. In the meantime, Bogert put the Calgary 
Tanks to use as mobile artillery, the direct fire of 
their flat trajectory, 75 mm guns being more easily 
applied to support the infantry, fighting in the close 
confines of the town, than the indirect fire of the 
artillery's field guns.31 The gunners instead went 
to work pummelling the main German position 
further up the northern slope where the destructive 
bursts of the 25-pounder shells would not pose a 
threat to the West Novas. 
The advance of "Boforce" had been much more 
rapid than the German staff officers had planned 
for, and only a scratch force of paratroops had been 
rushed to Potenza from the Salerno sector at the 
last minute. One company-sized mixed group, 
heavy on machine-guns, and complete with an anti-
tank detachment, had reached the town by the 
afternoon of 19 September.32 The paratroopers were 
to have been only the vanguard for a larger force 
tasked with holding the town in accordance with 
the phased withdrawal, but instead they fought 
alone and unsupported by artillery. The veteran 
German soldiers used what little time they had 
before the Canadians were upon them, to skilfully 
position their machine guns with such effective 
inter-locking fields of fire that, until the Canadian 
tanks crossed the river bed, any further frontal 
assault, while possible, would be bloody. 
This was readily apparent from Lieutenant-
Colonel Bogert's headquar te rs . Brigadier 
57 
It appears that no artillery fire plan was 
prepared to support the attack, although a Forward 
Observation Officer would go along with the leading 
companies.23 This, however, is not so unusual 
considering the absence of daylight to observe the 
ground over which the troops had to advance, 
coupled with the poor maps. It was also not 
customary to prepare such a plan until contact had 
been made with the enemy and the appropriate 
intelligence gathered regarding their positions. Once 
this had been done, the fire plan would take time to 
put together; in the case of the Liri Valley battle, 
later in the campaign, the plan took three days to 
complete.24 Neither the information nor the time 
was available for such detailed artillery support of 
the first attack at Potenza. 
At 0100 hours, 20 September the infantry and 
engineers moved down into the valley. "C," "D" and 
"A" Companies, the sappers, and a platoon of "B" 
Company, drove down towards the area of the first 
bridge, sacrificing the stealth of a foot-borne 
approach for the speed of their lorries. While the 
soldiers were dismounting, an "A" Company lorry 
struck a Teller mine, ripping through the cab, 
wounding seven of the occupants. Three more of 
the attached "B" Company soldiers were injured 
when their vehicle ran into the crater of another 
mine.25 Ten men were out of action, surprise was 
lost and not a shot had yet been fired; some of the 
most decisive factors in war are those which are 
not expected. 
At 0300 hours the sudden roar of small arms 
fire broke the early morning calm as an "A" 
Company patrol chased off another German 
demolition detail as it was attempting to blow the 
second bridge.26 In the meantime, after the 
engineers had cleared the way, "C" and "D" 
Companies crossed the dry river bed and deployed 
for their advance into the town. It was nearly dawn 
as the point rifle sections climbed the steep 
embankment up to the railyard only to face a wall 
of flying steel. As the daylight grew, the plight of 
the lead companies became apparent. The German 
defenders, members of the crack 1st Parachute 
Division, had quite successfully isolated "C" and 
"D" companies from the remainder of the regiment. 
They did so by pinning those companies down with 
automatic weapons and at least one towed anti-
tank gun, while at the same time pouring fire down 
in the vicinity of the river bed, preventing the 
crossing of "A" and "B" Companies. The armour 
could not yet cross either, as it was held up by the 
blown bridge and accompanying mines. The best 
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perfect. The Vandoos moved off from their 
startline at 1230 hours, five miles east of 
Potenza, but still in view of the German 
paratroopers. This advance began just as the 
sappers were completing their work at the 
bridge site allowing the armour to finally get 
into the fight directly. With their position being 
outf lanked, and only limited a n t i - t a n k 
capability to deal with the armoured threat in 
Penhale, under the watchful eye of Major-
General Simonds, both of whom had arrived 
sometime in the mid-morning, put together a 
plan of attack utilizing the entire 3rd Brigade. 
To begin with, the 4th Field Company of the 
Royal Canadian Engineers was brought up to 
assist the 1st Field Company sappers still 
working at clearing a crossing near the first 
bridge, so that the tanks could get forward to 
Left. A Medium Machine Gun of the Saskatoon Light Infantry harasses German paratroopers defending 
Potenza. (NAC PA 189888) Right: A Canadian army photographer lights the cigarette of an Italian civilian 
who hid a downed American airman in his home near Potenza. (NAC PA 193391) 
front, the Germans faced two options: fight on 
and be annihilated or withdraw to fight another 
day. The latter choice was apparently planned 
for as the German motor transport awaited the 
retreating defenders on the other side of a 
railway tunnel which cut through the high 
ground to the northeast.37 
The bulk of the Germans escaped through 
the tunnel but several snipers were left in the 
town to be mopped up by the West Novas. The 
remainder of the armour, along with two 
platoons of "B" Company riding on top and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert in his command jeep, 
pushed up the main road into Potenza. The 
officer in command of the Calgary tank 
support "D" and "C" Companies.33 The principal 
effort would be shifted to the east where the 
Royal 22e Regiment, which arrived during the 
night , would carry out a wide flanking 
movement on the Canadian right, to seize the 
heights behind the town.34 Such an attack over 
relatively open ground would be more easily 
supported by artillery. The fire of all three 
batteries of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery's 
1st Field Regiment was to assist the Vandoos' 
attack.35 The Carleton and York Regiment was 
in reserve.36 
The plan was not set into motion until 
shortly after noon, but either by design or by 
chance the timing could not have been more 
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mission began without the customary large 
supply base, and proceeded up a narrow road 
axis with relatively open flanks, in order to strike 
deep into the thinly held enemy left. The move 
was not typically Montgomery, but then again, 
"Boforce" was not Montgomery's idea.43 
The spectacular success of "Boforce" went 
unknown for some time to other Canadians back 
in England and at home, anxious for news about 
the only Canadian ground troops active in any 
theatre at that time. No reports could be released 
because "it was essential that the enemy should 
not realize that a single infantry division was 
covering the whole wide front from west of 
Potenza to the vicinity of Taranto."44 
Even in the years after the war, in comparison 
to the larger, and bloodier, Italian battles like 
Ortona and the Hitler Line, the small action at 
Potenza would not get much attention. Yet the 
absence of heavy fighting and huge casualty lists 
is exactly what made "Boforce" so successful, for 
the speed and surprise with which the team 
descended upon the town were the keys to its 
victory. 
The battle does sit at the centre of the 
controversy regarding whether Eighth Army 
could have advanced faster out of Calabria, to 
support Fifth Army in its crisis at Salerno. In 
this context, some historians and strategists, 
mostly American, have judged that Eighth Army 
operations conducted during those crucial days 
in September were insignificant. This may in 
fact be true, yet when the Canadian drive to 
Potenza is considered as part of the effort to 
hasten the German forces withdrawing from the 
Salerno area, and to seize the Foggia airfields, 
then it can only be judged as a great achievement. 
William McAndrew points out in "Fire or 
Movement?" that Simonds' had outlined his 
offensive method in a 1939 article for the 
Canadian Defence Quarterly. In "The Attack" 
Simond's identified two types of defensive action. 
In one, the defender attempts to deny information 
to the attacker. "The action required of the 
infantry will necessitate tactics of manoeuvre and 
infiltration through close country, not an attack 
with a set fire plan." The other type of action 
finds the defender in prepared positions which 
must be breached in a set-piece assault.45 Given 
that the Germans originally intended to hold 
Potenza in some strength, Boforce does not fit 
into either model. 
59 
squadron was rather reluctant to proceed forward 
due to the threat posed by the German anti-
tank guns. Bogert informed the tank officer that 
he intended to drive into the town in his jeep 
and he expected the tanks to accompany him.38 
After consolidating the town and dispatching 
patrols to make contact with flanking Allied units, 
this stage of 1st Canadian Division's operations 
was complete and the two Allied armies were 
linked in a continuous front from Bari to Salerno. 
Canadian casualties for this comparatively small-
scale operation were "light," six killed and a 
further 21 wounded. Casualties among the 
German paratroopers are unknown, although 16 
prisoners were left behind, mostly wounded.39 
The cost of war in Potenza was further magnified 
by the civilian death toll resulting from the Allied 
bombing, estimates of which ran as high as 
2,000, the corpses still rotting in the sun as the 
Canadians entered the town.40 
The Canadian objective of accelerating the 
German withdrawal program had been 
accomplished. The unexpectedly rapid advance 
by "Boforce" to Potenza was a key factor in the 
German line retreating ahead of its intended 
schedule. On 1 October, Eighth Army had 
penetrated 20 miles beyond the notional German 
defence line in front of Foggia, which was to have 
become operational just at that time. In spite of 
these dramatic strides forward the situation was 
stabilized by mid-October, and the opportunities 
for further substantial exploitation on the Adriatic 
front had dried up. This stalling of Eighth Army's 
advance was the direct result of the same 
logistical problems that had plagued it since 
landing at Reggio.41 
A quest ion emerges from this ra ther 
simplistic explanation: Why was the German 
army, usually so meticulous in operational staff 
work, so badly mistaken as to the rate of the 
Canadian advance? The question is a complex 
one, and it hinges on the fact that the use of 
fast, mobile, all arms columns was a departure 
from the operational norms of the Canadian and 
British armies developed in the close country of 
Sicily and Italy.42 It cannot be stated for certain, 
but it is probable that the German plan for a 
phased withdrawal, initiated on 18 September, 
was based on their perception of standard British 
operational methods, which were seen as rather 
slow and ponderous, each new step forward being 
launched from a consolidated base, and only after 
large stocks of supplies had been brought to 
forward dumps to sustain the drive. The Potenza 
9
Windsor: “Boforce”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1995
12. WD, West Nova Scot ia Regiment [West NSR], 18 
September 1943. 
13. WD, West NSR, 18 September 1943. 
14. WD, West NSR, 19 September 1943; Raddall, pp . 126-
127. 
15. WD. West NSR, 19 September 1943. A Teller mine is 
one type of German ant i- tank mine. 
16. Raddall. p. 127. 
17. Nicholson, Italy, p .228 . 
18. WD. 3 rd C a n a d i a n Infant ry Br igade [3 CIB], 19 
September 1943. 
19. Interview with Major-General M.R Bogert, 11 September 
1993. 
20. WD, West NSR, 19 September 1943. 
21 . Nicholson, Italy, p .227. 
22. WD, West NSR, 19 September 1943. 
23. WD, l s t Royal Canadian Horse Artillery [1st RCHA], 20 
September 1943. 
24. McAndrew, Military Affairs, p .140 . 
25. WD, West NSR, 20 September 1943. 
26. WD, West NSR, 20 September 1943. 
27. D a n i e l G. D a n c o c k s , The D-Day Dodgers: The 
Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart Inc., 1991) p. 124. 
28. Interview with Maj-Gen. Bogert. 
29. WD, 3 CIB, 20 September 1943. 
30. WD, 3 CIB, 20 September 1943. 
31 . WD. 14th C a n a d i a n T a n k Regiment (Calgary) 20 
September 1943. 
32. Nicholson, Italy, p .228. 
33. Kerry, McDill, p .157. 
34. WD. 3 CIB, 20 S e p t e m b e r 1943 ; WD. Royal 22e 
Regiment, 20 September 1943. The Royal 22e Regiment 
is often referred to by their n ickname, the Vandoos, 
w h i c h i s d e r i v e d from t h e F r e n c h - C a n a d i a n 
pronunciation of the number, vingt-deux. 
35. WD, 1st RCHA, 20 September 1943. 
36. WD, 3 CIB, 20 September 1943. 
37. Raddall, p. 129. 
38 . Interview with Major-General Bogert. 
39. Nicholson, Italy, p .229 . 
40. Nicholson, Italy, p .228. 
4 1 . Trumball Higgins, Soft Underbelly: The Anglo-American 
Controversy Over the Italian Campaign, 1939-1945 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968) p. 122. 
42. Prior to Montgomery's a s sumpt ion of command of 
Eighth Army in North Africa, extensive use had been 
made of "Jock Columns." Neither Montgomery, or the 
Sicilian terrain were receptive to such tactics and t hus 
these combat teams were not often used in the Italian 
theatre. 
43 . Intelligence S u m m a r y , 3 CIB; WD. West NSR, 13 
September, Appendix 1(a). This report predicts that no 
major German defensive operations will be conducted 
south of the Salerno-Naples area. 
44. C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army: 1939-1945 (Ottawa: 
King's Printer, 1948) p. 109. 
45. McAndrew, Military Affairs, p. 144. 
Lee Windsor is currently completing his Master 
of Arts at Wilfrid Laurier University. He completed 
his undergraduate degree at Acadia University 
and has served in the West Nova Scotia 
Regiment and the 8th Canadian Hussars. 
The plan was the result of a necessity for 
rapid advance, combined with limitations of 
strained logistics and limited intelligence on the 
enemy's intentions. "Boforce's" success derived 
partly from the German underestimation of the 
speed and initiative of the troops facing them 
as well as strong Canadian leadership at the 
operational and tactical levels. Simonds' flexible 
plan was well executed by Bogert who pushed 
relentlessly forward yet always under the 
umbrella of his 25-pounders. Once engaged, 
Bogert effectively employed of all available direct 
and indirect-fire weapons. The operation was 
daring but not foolhardy. Canadians can take 
pride in the accomplishment of their fathers at 
Potenza, yet it is but one example. If historians 
are to assess the performance of the Canadian 
Army in battle, then they must examine its 
success in just as much detail as its failure. 
In Memory of Jim Stokesbury, my teacher and 
my friend. 
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